The South Waziristan chieftan's name is being used in the same tones as those used for brand-name terrorists of days gone by, but is he really a big deal?

From the LAT:

Not so long ago, Baitullah Mahsud was an obscure tribal sub-chieftain, little known outside his ancestral district set amid the forbidding, snow-shrouded mountains and valleys of South Waziristan.

Now, in a matter of months, he has emerged as the most notorious insurgent commander in Pakistan, blamed by authorities not only for masterminding Benazir Bhutto's assassination, but for waging a virtual one-man jihad against the government of President Pervez Musharraf.
Mahsud, who late in 2007 became the leader of Pakistan's Taliban movement, is accused of sending dozens of suicide bombers into Pakistani cities over the last year. He is also said to have unleashed a guerrilla campaign that has rattled Pakistan's powerful military and brought pitched battles to the doorstep of Peshawar, capital of the volatile North-West Frontier Province and gateway to Afghanistan and Pakistan's tribal belt.

Some observers regard Mahsud as the most potent threat to emerge in years from the tribal milieu, a leader who has shown himself capable of unifying an array of disparate homegrown groups, even while exchanging crucial logistical aid, know-how and resources with Al Qaeda. If his coalition holds firm, these observers say, he could be in a position to threaten not only Musharraf but the Pakistani state.

But the ascension of Mahsud has also prompted debate among analysts and military officials as to his true stature within the larger Al Qaeda-driven insurgency based in the tribal areas -- a network whose strength and reach has been the subject of sharp new warnings this month by senior U.S. intelligence officials.

Some observers see Mahsud as more of a figurehead, a handy scapegoat for a plethora of hostile acts unlikely to have been engineered by the same person. There are persistent suggestions, they say, that Mahsud is being used by elements within the Pakistani security establishment to further their own goals; before her death, opposition leader Bhutto herself described him as a "pawn."

Despite his growing infamy, Mahsud has preserved an aura of secrecy, speaking rarely to outsiders and scrupulously avoiding being photographed. Even his age is a mystery; he is believed to be in his 40s.

He sleeps in safe houses, makes sparing use of electronic communication, travels with an entourage of heavily armed bodyguards, and unhesitatingly orders the deaths of subordinates who fail to carry out his wishes, according to several people with access to detailed intelligence.

Those who have met him describe a surprisingly unprepossessing figure. He stands only about 5 feet tall and wears his hair long and shaggy in the manner of his Mahsud tribe. Uneducated beyond the madrasa level, he is troubled by health problems stemming from diabetes.

"He wasn't the imposing tribal type I expected," said Iqbal Khattak, a Peshawar-based journalist who has met Mahsud several times. "But in spite of his appearance, you could see that he has an authority about him."

Both Mahsud and Al Qaeda vowed to take revenge against Musharraf after government forces in July stormed a radical mosque in the capital, killing its chief cleric and dozens of his young disciples, many of whom were from South Waziristan. Even before the government assault on the Red Mosque, both groups had disdained the Pakistani leader as a tool of the West for allying himself with Washington in the fight against Islamic militants.

Estimates of the size of Mahsud's corps of fighters vary widely. His inner circle of several hundred armed followers is mainly drawn from his tribe, whose reputation as a feared fighting force dates back to British colonial times.

In mid-December, however, Mahsud assumed leadership of an umbrella group known as the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, or the Taliban movement of Pakistan, encompassing at least half a dozen militant groups and more than 20,000 fighters, officials and analysts believe.

"He's a very clever and committed fighter, a good tactician, with no qualms at all about extreme forms of violence" such as beheadings, said Mehmood Shah, a retired brigadier general with long experience in the tribal areas.

However, he hasn't really seized and held territory during the current insurgency. Instead, he raids, humiliates government forces, and disappears again.

... There are doubts about his ability to pose a long-term threat to more than 100,000 Pakistani troops in the tribal regions.

"I think Baitullah Mahsud is given a hell of a lot more credit for command and control than he actually possesses," said a Western military official on condition of anonymity.

Shah, the retired brigadier general, also said he believed Mahsud was a "front man" incapable of personally orchestrating a large-scale campaign against government forces.

But Mahsud is able to capitalize on overwhelming resentment of the Musharraf government in the tribal areas, where the Pakistani army, the same Western official acknowledged, "is seen as an occupying force."

Mehsud has cut deals with the government in the past, most notably a 2005 "peace deal" in South Waziristan that most now say merely gave militants a chance to regroup. Mehsud recently declared another ceasefre.

Some wonder why, if Mehsud is such a big deal, the government isn't going after him with both barrels.

Musharraf said in December that extracting or killing Mahsud would require thousands of troops, probably causing heavy civilian casualties.

Others are unsure, however, whether the government is motivated to go after Mahsud. "No one knows if it is actually a goal to get him," said Khalid Aziz, a former chief secretary of the North-West Frontier Province.

In the meantime, Mahsud's movement has not fully wielded its potential power to wreak havoc, some analysts say.

"For the first time, you have a wide range of virulently anti-Pakistan groups under a unified command," said Syed Adnan Bukhari, a Pakistani researcher who specializes in militant groups in the tribal areas.

"The group is not so much active right now," he said. "But if it continues to consolidate itself, it can pose a genuine threat to the Pakistani state."