While United 93 powerfully captures the drama of the final moments of that doomed flight, you should also see it for the depiction of what else went wrong that terrible morning on Sept. 11, 2001.

Some of the coverage has focused on the film's taking of dramatic licence.

In an April 28 Washington Post article, staff journalist Paul Farhi notes the movie showing passengers attempting to breach the cockpit with a meal cart, but nothing in the 9/11 Commission's findings that backs that up (see Chapter 1: "We have some planes."; scroll down to The Battle for United 93).

To me, however, there are much, much better things to get steamed about, and generally speaking, I'm not talking about getting steamed at the filmmakers.

For one thing, the film left out that Ahmad al Haznawi, one of the United 93 hijackers, had been red-flagged by CAPPS (Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System, a system for warning who should be subjected to special security checks). Actually, six of the 18 other hijackers on the other three flights triggered CAPPS alerts,

However, once their luggage was found to be explosives-free and they boarded the aircraft, then the alert was off. The system at that point wasn't worried so much about potential suicide hijackers as it was about potential bombers.

The first aircraft to be detected as a possible hijack was American Airlines Flight 11, bound for L.A. out of Boston's Logan International Airport.

In the movie, an alert controller picks up that a hijack might be in progress. In the early going, his colleagues mildly scoff at him. "When was the last time we had a hijacking?" one wonders out loud (according to the report, 1993 was the last time NORAD and the FAA had to co-operate on a hijacking. The film doesn't tell us that).

The commission found the hijacking likely started at 8:14 a.m. EDT. A flight attendant reported an emergency on board at about 8:19 a.m., it said. The commission also found the hijackers made an inadvertent radio transmission just before 8:25 a.m. when they attempted to communicate with the passengers.

However, NORAD wouldn't be notified for another six to 15 minutes, according to the Co-operative Research 9/11 Timeline. At the outer edge, that would make it about 8:40 a.m. before NORAD knew.

Flight 11 ended at 8:46 a.m. when it crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center, killing all aboard and leading to the deaths of an unknown number of people in the building.

However, Flight 11 was only the first of four flights to be hijacked that day.

United Airlines Flight 175, bound for L.A. out of Boston, took off at 8:14 a.m. and was likely hijacked between 8:42 a.m. and 8:46 a.m. It would fly into the WTC's south tower at 9:03:10 a.m.

In the report, one man had been talking with his son, who was aboard the flight. The man turned on the TV just in time to see the plane hit the building.

Down in Washington, American Airlines Flight 77 took off at 8:20 a.m., bound for L.A. The hijacking took place between 8:51 a.m. and 8:54 a.m.

By 9 a.m., American Airlines realized Flight 77 was in trouble. At 9:37:46 a.m., the airliner crashed into the Pentagon.

United 93 was supposed to take off for San Francisco from Newark, N.J. at 8 a.m., but was delayed until 8:42 a.m. Had it been delayed another five or 10 minutes, its passengers and hijackers might have been able to witness Flight 11 hit the WTC. :(

However, had it taken off on time, it's likely all four targets that day would have been hit. :( :(

The hijacking of United 93 itself started at 9:28 a.m. At 9:23 a.m., the flight's pilots had been informed that the WTC had been attacked and they should increase cockpit security, according to the report.

I'll have to see the film again, because I don't really remember timestamp supers on the screen. I don't know if I just missed them.

Timing is important in understanding all of this. For example, Ben Sliney, the Federal Aviation Administration's national operations manager, ordered the grounding of all U.S. flights at 9:42 a.m. The show was largely over by that point. Three targets had been hit.

Similarly, one of the NORAD officers was asking at 9:36 a.m. whether he had shoot-down authority.

United 93 would remain in the air for 21 minutes. It would crash into a field near Shanksville, Pa. about 20 minutes flying time short of its likely targets -- the White House or the Capitol Building (in the movie, hijacker Ziad Farrah had a picture of the Capitol Building in front of him).

Other troubles

On the morning of 9-11, NORAD was holding a war games exercise, but as the morning wore on, there was reportedly some confusion whether the hijackings were real or part of the game.

The military didn't find out about the Flight 11 hijacking until almost 9:38 a.m. By the fighters were airborne at 8:46 a.m., Flight 11 had "landed" in upper level's of the WTC's north tower.

Part of the problem is that the jets were "trained" to hone in on the aircraft's unique transponder signal, but the hijackers had turned them off. From the report:

Radar data show the Otis fighters were airborne at 8:53. Lacking a target, they were vectored toward military-controlled airspace off the Long Island coast. To avoid New York area air traffic and uncertain about what to do, the fighters were brought down to military airspace to "hold as needed. "From 9:09 to 9:13, the Otis fighters stayed in this holding pattern.¹²⁰

In summary, NEADS received notice of the hijacking nine minutes before it struck the North Tower. That nine minutes' notice before impact was the most the military would receive of any of the four hijackings.¹²¹

Of course, by 9:03 a.m., the United 175 flight had hit the WTC's south tower, so the action was already over in New York.

In the movie, jets had been scrambled out of Langley Air Force Base in Virginia, but  had been sent out over the Atlantic Ocean to the east first, instead of north to Washington. "What the fuck?!?!" yells one officer (in the film) in disbelief.*

From the 9-11 report:

At the suggestion of the Boston Center's military liaison, NEADS contacted the FAA's Washington Center to ask about American 11. In the course of the conversation, a Washington Center manager informed NEADS: "We're looking-we also lost American 77."The time was 9:34.¹⁵¹This was the first notice to the military that American 77 was missing, and it had come by chance. If NEADS had not placed that call, the NEADS air defenders would have received no information whatsoever that the flight was even missing, although the FAA had been searching for it. No one at FAA headquarters ever asked for military assistance with American 77.

At 9:36, the FAA's Boston Center called NEADS and relayed the discovery about an unidentified aircraft closing in on Washington: "Latest report. Aircraft VFR [visual flight rules] six miles southeast of the White House. . . . Six, southwest. Six, southwest of the White House, deviating away." This startling news prompted the mission crew commander at NEADS to take immediate control of the airspace to clear a flight path for the Langley fighters: "Okay, we're going to turn it . . . crank it up. . . . Run them to the White House." He then discovered, to his surprise, that the Langley fighters were not headed north toward the Baltimore area as instructed, but east over the ocean. "I don't care how many windows you break," he said. "Damn it.. . . Okay. Push them back."¹⁵²

The Langley fighters were heading east, not north, for three reasons. First, unlike a normal scramble order, this order did not include a distance to the target or the target's location. Second, a "generic" flight plan-prepared to get the aircraft airborne and out of local airspace quickly-incorrectly led the Langley fighters to believe they were ordered to fly due east (090) for 60 miles. Third, the lead pilot and local FAA controller incorrectly assumed the flight plan instruction to go "090 for 60" superseded the original scramble order.¹⁵³

After the 9:36 call to NEADS about the unidentified aircraft a few miles from the White House, the Langley fighters were ordered to Washington, D.C. Controllers at NEADS located an unknown primary radar track, but "it kind of faded" over Washington. The time was 9:38.The Pentagon had been struck by American 77 at 9:37:46.The Langley fighters were about 150 miles away.¹⁵⁴

In the movie, one NORAD commander says, "I can't protect the entire eastern U.S. seaboard with four planes."*

From the 9-11 report:

NORAD perceived the dominant threat to be from cruise missiles. Other threats were identified during the late 1990s, including terrorists' use of aircraft as weapons. Exercises were conducted to counter this threat, but they were not based on actual intelligence. In most instances, the main concern was the use of such aircraft to deliver weapons of mass destruction.

Prior to 9/11, it was understood that an order to shoot down a commercial aircraft would have to be issued by the National Command Authority (a phrase used to describe the president and secretary of defense). Exercise planners also assumed that the aircraft would originate from outside the United States, allowing time to identify the target and scramble interceptors. The threat of terrorists hijacking commercial airliners within the United States-and using them as guided missiles-was not recognized by NORAD before 9/11.⁹⁸

Notwithstanding the identification of these emerging threats, by 9/11 there were only seven alert sites left in the United States, each with two fighter aircraft on alert. This led some NORAD commanders to worry that NORAD was not postured adequately to protect the United States.⁹⁹

In the United States, NORAD is divided into three sectors. On 9/11, all the hijacked aircraft were in NORAD's Northeast Air Defense Sector (also known as NEADS), which is based in Rome, New York. That morning NEADS could call on two alert sites, each with one pair of ready fighters: Otis Air National Guard Base in Cape Cod, Massachusetts, and Langley Air Force Base in Hampton, Virginia.¹⁰⁰ Other facilities, not on "alert," would need time to arm the fighters and organize crews.

NEADS reported to the Continental U.S. NORAD Region (CONR) headquarters, in Panama City, Florida, which in turn reported to NORAD headquarters, in Colorado Springs, Colorado.

As you can gather above, shooting down a civilian airliner requires an order from the President of the United States.

One of the meaner scenes in Farenheit 9/11, a very partisan movie, occurs when provokumentarian Michael Moore asks what could have possibly been going through Dubya's mind after he kept reading My Pet Goat to a bunch of elementary school children in Sarasota, Fla. even though he knew both WTC towers had been hit.

Here's the official version from the 9-11 commission:

The President was seated in a classroom when, at 9:05, Andrew Card (note: Bush's then-chief of staff - BD) whispered to him: "A second plane hit the second tower. America is under attack." The President told us his instinct was to project calm, not to have the country see an excited reaction at a moment of crisis. The press was standing behind the children; he saw their phones and pagers start to ring. The President felt he should project strength and calm until he could better understand what was happening.²⁰³

The President remained in the classroom for another five to seven minutes, while the children continued reading. He then returned to a holding room shortly before 9:15, where he was briefed by staff and saw television coverage. He next spoke to Vice President Cheney, Dr. Rice, New York Governor George Pataki, and FBI Director Robert Mueller. He decided to make a brief statement from the school before leaving for the airport. The Secret Service told us they were anxious to move the President to a safer location, but did not think it imperative for him to run out the door.²⁰⁴

Between 9:15 and 9:30, the staff was busy arranging a return to Washington, while the President consulted his senior advisers about his remarks. No one in the traveling party had any information during this time that other aircraft were hijacked or missing. Staff was in contact with the White House Situation Room, but as far as we could determine, no one with the President was in contact with the Pentagon. The focus was on the President's statement to the nation. The only decision made during this time was to return to Washington.²⁰⁵

The President's motorcade departed at 9:35, and arrived at the airport between 9:42 and 9:45. During the ride the President learned about the attack on the Pentagon. He boarded the aircraft, asked the Secret Service about the safety of his family, and called the Vice President. According to notes of the call, at about 9:45 the President told the Vice President: "Sounds like we have a minor war going on here, I heard about the Pentagon. We're at war . . . somebody's going to pay."²⁰⁶

You'll notice that nowhere in there does it talk about Dubya granting shoot-down authority to NORAD. He did discuss a shootdown order with Cheney, but it wasn't until sometime between 10:10 a.m. and 10:15 a.m. (the order was confirmed by 10:20 a.m. at the latest). By that time, United 93 was already a smouldering ruin on the ground.

But in fairness, due to the whole fucked-up situation that morning, even if he had, it wouldn't have made much difference.

The fighters weren't given enough notice and the plan to have them hone in on the aircrafts' transponders was artfully checked by the hijackers having turned them off or changed them. In the case of AA 11, this forced the controllers to use much-less-efficient primary radar. There were literally hundreds, if not thousands, of aircraft airborne in the U.S. Northeast that morning.

FAA officials seemingly had trouble, at least in the early going, believing there was one hijacking going on. The realization that there were multiple hijackings was really mind-blowing to them. Sliney first heard the phrase "We have some planes" around 8:34 a.m.

The enormity of the situation didn't dawn until after both WTC towers had been hit.

While the FAA's hijack co-ordinator is responsible for liaising with the National Military Command Centre, Mike Canavan had spent the day in Puerto Rico. The 9-11 commission didn't ask Canavan if he'd designated a backup for the day, according to the timeline prepared by Co-operative Research.

I'm telling you, folks, it just goes on and on and on.

The bottom line

While much of the media coverage to date has focused on what happened aboard United 93, to me, the backstory about how everything that could go wrong, did go wrong, is the true tragedy of that day.

Al Qaeda's four teams of hijackers caught the United States flatfooted. The systems designed to protect Americans failed on so many levels, not the least of which is imagination.

At the same time, individuals were trying to do their best under some very dire circumstances.

While the passengers and crew of United 93 provide the money shot in this film (a bunch of kids started cheering when they started moving towards the cockpit), they also had their counterparts elsewhere trying desperately to respond to this unprecedented situation.

Ultimately, by showing the overall chaos of the day and bringing to life what might otherwise just be words in another commission report, I think director Paul Greengrass has done everyone a very big favour -- perhaps bigger than just elegizing the actions of those who fought back against United 93's hijackers.