The slow-motion Iran nuclear crisis got more interesting Tuesday when the International Atomic Energy Agency released a report saying Iran has black market documents that would serve no earthly purpose except to help it build a nuclear warhead.

Today (Thursday), the IAEA meets in Vienna to decide whether to send Iran to the UN Security Council, where international sanctions could be imposed.

Here, courtesy of the BBC, is the full text of the draft resolution.

Nothing is likely to happen until March, when the Security Council will also get a full-meal-deal report from the IAEA on Iran.

However, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has been crowing up a storm, saying Iran has a right to develop peaceful nuclear power. He has warned of "immediate retaliation" if his nation is referred to the Security Council by commencing a full-scale enrichment program..

But here's the thing: Back on Jan. 10, Iran started breaking the seals on some of its nuclear facilities and said it would start uranium again (plain old uranium isn't useful for nuclear power generation or bombs).

In its Tuesday report, however, the IAEA said it had no evidence Iran had commenced the enrichment process again.

Is that because Iran actually hasn't, or because the IAEA has made a mistake?

If Iran hasn't started again, a huge question is why? Is it all bluster and no muster with those guys? How far is Ahmadinejad willing to go in defying the international community?

The stakes in this game are very high. Iran has missiles capable of hitting Israel and Western Europe. Topping them off with nukes would be a highly destablizing thing (although if Pakistan's fundamentalists ever take charge, we'll immediately have a radical Islamic state with the bomb).

A Salon article I pointed to suggests a bigger problem is it will trigger a nuclear arms race throughout the Middle East, so we could have lots of unstable regimes with nukes.

That is unacceptable to global security, but when push comes to shove, how aggressive will the Security Council be with Iran? In a world with finite oil supplies, Iran has lots, and China has a growing appetite for black gold. Russia sees itself as having significant economic interests in Iran (it has been working on a deal to enrich Iran's uranium on Russian soil).

How hard would they be willing to push for meaningful sanctions?

Here's an excerpt from a Jan. 31 NYT story:

Russia and China had resisted the American and European demand for an early "referral" from the International Atomic Energy Agency to the Security Council, fearing that Iran would follow through on threats to expel international inspectors. Russia had proposed to avoid a confrontation by having the issue sent to the Security Council, as a matter of information, but without formally transferring it in a manner that paved the way for Council action.

The compromise worked out on Monday night and Tuesday morning, at the home of British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, was that Iran would indeed be referred — the word used was "reported" —reflecting an actual transfer of its dossier, but that the Council would not act until an atomic energy agency meeting in March.

The compromise on the technical question of an informational report versus a formal referral, hammered out over dinner at Mr. Straw's house, appeared to mean that Russia and China would not simply let the international atomic agency act, but also possibly vote in favor of it rather than abstain.

A "yes" vote by them was the "clear implication" of the statement their foreign ministers signed, the American official said.

My interpretation of that (and please tell me if you think I'm wrong) is that Russia and China don't appear willing at this point to truly pressure Tehran.

And if the only sanctions or punishments they agree to are meaningless ones, then where does that leave us?