Thomas L. Friedman's latest book-length look at globalization is now out. As befitting a columnist of his stature, the NYT ran not one but two reviews:
An excerpt from a review by Fareed Zakaria (editor of Newsweek International). While I'm highlighting the problems he found in the excerpt I've chosen, keep in mind he liked the book. Read the whole review!
There are difficulties with the book. Once Friedman gets through explicating his main point, he throws in too many extras -- perhaps trying to make that chocolate sundae -- making the book seem slightly padded. The process of flattening that he is describing is in its infancy. India is still a poor third-world country, but if you read this book you would assume it is on the verge of becoming a global superstar. (Though as an Indian-American, I read Friedman and whisper the old Jewish saying, ''From your lips to God's ears.'') And while this book is not as powerful as Friedman's earlier ones -- it is, as the publisher notes, an ''update'' of ''The Lexus and the Olive Tree'' -- its fundamental insight is true and deeply important.
In explaining this insight and this new world, Friedman can sometimes sound like a technological determinist. And while he does acknowledge political factors, they get little space in the book, which gives it a lopsided feel. I would argue that one of the primary forces driving the flat world is actually the shifting attitudes and policies of governments around the world. From Brazil to South Africa to India, governments are becoming more market-friendly, accepting that the best way to cure poverty is to aim for high-growth policies. This change, more than any other, has unleashed the energy of the private sector. After all, India had hundreds of thousands of trained engineers in the 1970's, but they didn't produce growth. In the United States and Europe, deregulation policies spurred the competition that led to radical innovation. There is a chicken-and-egg problem, to be sure. Did government policies create the technological boom or vice versa? At least one can say that each furthered the other.
The largest political factor is, of course, the structure of global politics. The flat economic world has been created by an extremely unflat political world. The United States dominates the globe like no country since ancient Rome. It has been at the forefront, pushing for open markets, open trade and open politics. But the consequence of these policies will be to create a more nearly equal world, economically and politically. If China grows economically, at some point it will also gain political ambitions. If Brazil continues to surge, it will want to have a larger voice on the international stage. If India gains economic muscle, history suggests that it will also want the security of a stronger military. Friedman tells us that the economic relations between states will be a powerful deterrent to war, which is true if nations act sensibly. But as we have seen over the last three years, pride, honor and rage play a large part in global politics.
The ultimate challenge for America -- and for Americans -- is whether we are prepared for this flat world, economic and political. While hierarchies are being eroded and playing fields leveled as other countries and people rise in importance and ambition, are we conducting ourselves in a way that will succeed in this new atmosphere? Or will it turn out that, having globalized the world, the United States had forgotten to globalize itself?
And now, here's a review by Joseph Stiglitz, a Nobel Prize-winning economist:
Mr. Friedman is right that there are forces flattening the world, but there are other forces making it less flat. At issue is the balance between them. So is the world really much flatter than before?
For instance, the new technologies that Mr. Friedman praises as levelers have also given rise to new opportunities for monopolization. Mr. Friedman praises Netscape's leveling role: its browser has really helped to put a world of knowledge and information at each person's doorstep (or computer). But Microsoft was able to use its own market power through control of computer operating systems to effectively replace Netscape with its own browser, Internet Explorer. While Microsoft speaks eloquently of the need to reward innovation, the real rewards are often not reaped by the innovators.
In addition, the underlying research for major developments like the Internet and Web browsers is expensive. Large, rich countries can pay for it; poor, small ones cannot. Mr. Friedman notes, but does not emphasize as much as he might, the important role played by government in financing such research before allowing private entrepreneurs to bring the actual products to market - and make the profits. American companies have a distinct advantage in benefiting from government-financed research, even though there are crumbs (some quite large) that those around the world can pick up.
Meanwhile, the new "rules of the game" that were part of the last round of global trade negotiations - notably intellectual property regulations requiring all countries to adopt American-style patent and copyright laws - are almost surely making the playing field less level. They will make it easier for those who are ahead of the game to maintain their lead.
One mark of a great book is that it makes you see things in a new way, and Mr. Friedman certainly succeeds in that goal. The world may not yet be flat, but there is no doubt that there are important forces - some leveling, some the opposite - that are changing its shape in critical ways. And in his provocative account, Mr. Friedman suggests what this brave new world will mean to all of us, in both the developed and the developing worlds.