OK, so now we have a UN-approved resolution to halt the hostilities in Lebanon. How easy will de-fanging Hezbollah be without a political settlement that Hezbollah can buy into? I think we all know the answer: Not very.

An excerpt from an Aug. 10 Globe and Mail analysis by Paul Koring:

The other crucial element is whether Hezbollah is to be treated as a political player with a role in Lebanon and a party to any ceasefire agreement or -- as the Bush administration and Israel propose -- a terrorist organization to be hunted down and wiped out.

If it's the latter, the force may be doomed. "The Israelis were in Lebanon for 18 years from 1982 to 2000 and couldn't finish off Hezbollah. An international army is not going to be able to do it," Shibley Telhami, a University of Maryland professor specializing in Arab-Israeli conflicts told a Brookings Institution panel on resolving the crisis. "An international force is only helpful and useful and effective if all the parties agree to it, if they already agree to the principles, if Hezbollah buys into it, if Hezbollah is its ally, not its enemy."

Carrying a big stick -- that is, having a fighting mandate and the military punch to back it up -- could give any post-ceasefire force more political leverage.

"The role of an international force in Lebanon is fundamentally political," Lee Feinstein, a senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, said in a comment piece published this week. "The force needs to be seen as advancing an overall political approach which, realistically, must include the affected states in the region, including Syria and Iran. An international force dispatched to Lebanon can buy time and create political space. It cannot win an unwinnable war, and if dispatched to do so, is doomed to fail."